Meyer, John

11/5/2026

PD-0420-26

“Did the evidence sufficiently establish that appellant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found in his bathroom?

  1. Did the court of appeals, in contravention of this Court’s caselaw, wrongly weigh the absence of some factors against evidence connecting appellant to the methamphetamine?
  2. Given the strong evidence of drug dealing taking place out of his home and other facts linking him to the drugs, did the jury act rationally in concluding appellant knew of and possessed the drugs in his own bathroom?
  3. By focusing on many facts that the jury could have discarded or even held against appellant, did the court of appeals engage in an improper divide-and-conquer strategy?”

Meyer was found in a house police were drawn to because of foot-traffic consistent with narcotics distribution. A traffic stop of a recent visitor revealed drugs in her possession. Police obtained a warrant for the house. Meyer’s driver’s license and mail addressed to him—both found in the master bedroom—had the house’s address on it. He stipulated that it was the address he gave pretrial services after his arrest. He also told police on the scene that he had a gun in his room; the only firearm found was in the master bedroom. Meyer was charged with possession of methamphetamine found in a pill bottle on the counter of the ensuite master bathroom. He was also charged with possession of morphine found in a second pill bottle with a prescription label showing the name Katherine London. He was found guilty of the former but not guilty of the latter.

The court of appeals reversed. It applied the so-called “affirmative links” factors, see Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), and noted that most of them were absent. It focused on what it deemed the remaining relevant question: plain view. The court highlighted the perceived lack of evidence from anyone who could remember exactly what the condition of the pill bottle was when it was found or that the substance was immediately recognizable as contraband. The court then systematically rejected the other circumstances and pointed to other facts that it concluded militated against the verdict, such as the unkempt nature of the house and apparent ongoing construction therein. It had also earlier noted that women’s clothing was found in the master bedroom and in the closet.

The State argues on review that the opinion is a classic case of focusing on what evidence was absent while applying a divide-and-conquer approach to what evidence was present. As a threshold matter, the State challenges the court’s conclusion that there was no evidence the methamphetamine was in “plain view.” Regardless, the appropriate focus was on what appellant knew, not on what officers recognized. Meyer’s presence and claimed residence in a house reliably suspected of containing drug activity, with drugs and a firearm in his room, and other drugs found in the house, support the rational inference of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, his presence in a house where drugs were found (in his master bathroom) was neither “mere” nor “fortuitous.” The court arrived at its conclusion by drawing contrary inferences to those available to the jury, and by interjecting possible innocent explanations the jury could have rejected.