Perdomo-Mejia, Enrique
8/20/26
“Is the presence of a uniformed, armed guard directly behind a defendant testifying at the guilt phase of trial inherently prejudicial to the presumption of innocence, in violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?”
When Perdomo-Mejia testified at his jury trial for child sex abuse, an armed guard sat behind him per the sheriff’s policy. No armed guard sat behind any other witness. Perdomo-Mejia complained that, without a particular justification, the guard’s presence was akin to shackling and therefore prejudicial.
On appeal, Perdomo-Mejia claimed that the armed guard’s presence violated his presumption of innocence. The court of appeals rejected his claim, concluding that there was no showing of actual prejudice.
Perdomo-Mejia contends that the disparate treatment between witnesses left him with the “unmistakable mark of guilt.” He asserts that the sheriff’s policy didn’t justify the guard’s presence; the justification must be tailored to the defendant. Finally, he challenges the standard that the defendant must show prejudice. “Expecting a juror to interrupt a proceeding to articulate that the presence of the deputy is disruptive or distracting, without any instruction that is acceptable, is an unreasonable expectation or standard to determine whether the presumption of innocence was violated.”