Palomares, Alexander
8/20/26
"This is a case where the trial court and 7th Court of Appeals basically held that article 39.14 doesn't mean what it says and that the Court of Criminal Appeals recent rulings about 39.14 do not mean what they say and the prosecutor disclosing for the first time damaging evidence in the middle of a trial can be upheld without the defense having an appropriate remedy for the late disclosure. This is an issue as to whether the Mich[ael] Morton Act means anything or that trial judges can fashion a ‘remedy’ that is illogical and disconnected from reality. The Court must reverse the incorrect opinion of the 7th Court of Appeals."
Palomares was accused of several felony assaults against Glynda Rodriguez, a family or household member.
Four days before trial, the State notified Palomares that there were 601 jail phone calls, 48 video calls, and numerous text messages between Palomares and Rodriguez. The defense asked for a continuance. The State’s investigator testified that he is tasked with reviewing jail communications for the State and that the volume of calls is so high that it is “entirely impossible” to review every one, even for a single inmate. He stopped reviewing Palomares calls after finding they contained little verbalization or decipherable content. The trial court denied the motion for continuance after the State indicated it was not offering any of the communications.
Rodriguez testified reluctantly on the first day of trial and claimed to have lied to police when they responded to the incident. Outside of trial, she told prosecutors that Palomares had called her the night before, telling her not to say what really happened and to testify that she had made it up. The State downloaded these calls, had them translated, and emailed them to defense counsel before 8am on the second day of trial. Palomares again moved for a continuance saying he needed time to review the calls and obtain a translator. The trial court denied the continuance, explaining that the calls would not have been a surprise to their client. Rodriguez was more forthcoming in her testimony on the second day of trial and said her original statements to police had been truthful. She confirmed that she had testified falsely the day before at Palomares’ request. Palomares was convicted.
On appeal, Palomares again challenged the continuance denials. The court of appeals expressed concern about the State’s practice of routinely recording calls but not disclosing them to defense counsel but held that there was no harm given that Palomares was a participant and could have conveyed their content to counsel. It noted that even with additional time, Palomares had not established harm in a motion for new trial. It also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s remedy of providing another opportunity to cross-examine Rodriguez about the conversations. The second continuance motion was properly denied because it was not sworn and, in any case, disclosure within two days of the recordings’ creation was timely.
Palomares questions whether the State’s decision not to offer evidence should mean that the defense shouldn’t have time to review it. Counsel asks how he was supposed to file a written sworn motion on the second day of trial when he had already left his office. He argues that saying that he can rely on his client for what was in the calls would also justify not disclosing police reports or crime scene photos, on the theory that he could just ask his client. He contends that being able to cross-examine Rodriguez was of little value when, without a translator of his own, he could not offer the calls for impeachment or under the rule of optional completeness.