Burgos-Aviles, Ronald
]6/4/26
“The court of appeals’ rationale for rejecting Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in discharging his second-chair attorney and appointed a new one over his objection fails to properly apply the relevant caselaw.”
Burgos-Aviles was arrested and charged with murder for the deaths of his ex-girlfriend and shared child. Martinez was appointed to represent him. After the State announced its intent to seek the death penalty, the judge appointed Peña as lead counsel because Martinez was not “death qualified” to be lead counsel. Nine months later, Peña asked the trial court to remove and replace Martinez because differences over their assessment of the case were creating friction between them and unrealistic expectations in Burgos-Aviles. The trial court did so following a hearing and over the objection of both Martinez and Burgos-Aviles. The jury convicted Burgos-Aviles of capital murder but sentenced him to life in prison.
On appeal, Burgos-Aviles relied primarily on cases like Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), and Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), for the idea that a trial court has no inherent authority to remove an appointed attorney with whom the defendant has an established relationship unless there is “extraordinarily good cause.” The court of appeals found extraordinarily good cause in that the relationship between Peña and Martinez was irreparable and only Peña was “death qualified.” The alternative “would have left Burgos[-Aviles] without a lead counsel until another attorney qualified for death penalty cases could be found, appointed, and had a chance to review all that had happened to date.”
In his petition, Burgos-Aviles argues the court of appeals misconstrued the question, which was not whether the trial court could discharge one attorney but whether the decision to discharge Martinez instead of Peña was justified. He claims the court of appeals’s “reliance on Peña’s death-qualification is an improper legal factor that effectively privileges docket concerns over [his] right to counsel of choice.” Further, he claims, the court of appeals gave insufficient attention to his express objections and complaints that Peña was not sufficiently preparing his defense.