Philpot, Patrick (1)

04/02/2026

PD-0715-25

  1. “Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the cashier’s check
    purported to be the act of an entity called ‘PacPhil Bank.’”
  2. “One of the essential elements of forgery is that the writing purports to be the act of another who did not authorize the act. Does the statutory definition of ‘another’ require the person to be a real individual or entity?”
  3. “Whether a cashier’s check embodying the purported act of a fictitious entity isvoid on its face and, therefore, not a forgery.”
  4. “Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the exclusion of the statutory
    definition of ‘another’ and the accompanying pertinent statutory definitions of ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ ‘corporation,’ and ‘association’ from the jury charge did not egregiously harm Petitioner when those definitions were critical to the jury’s determination of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s act purported to be the act of another.”

Philpot, intending to get his friend out of jail, posed as a lawyer and bondsman and presented what purported to be a cashier’s check for his friend’s full bond amount, $1,028,000. The check was processed but suspicions about it led to the clerk halting the process: the check did not have a bank account number, routing number, or check number. Investigation revealed PacPhil Bank is not a legitimate bank, and the phone number and contact information on the check belonged to Philpot. At trial, where he represented himself, Philpot claimed it was a valid cashier’s check because PacPhil Bank was a trust operating under the Uniform Commercial Code with him as its trustee and treasurer, that he (and everyone) is a bank, and that he identified the drawee—PacPhil Bank—and signed it, thus authorizing payment to the county. He was convicted of forgery of a financial instrument. 

Philpot argued on appeal that he could not be guilty of forgery—uttering a “writing [that] purports . . . to be the act of another who did not authorize that act,” TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i)—because he was who he represented himself to be when he signed the check and he had authority to act for PacPhil Bank, a real entity under his conception of banking. Alternatively, PacPhil Bank does not meet any of the definitions ultimately encompassed within “another,” i.e., “individual or a corporation, association, limited liability company, or other entity or organization governed by the Business Organizations Code.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(38) (defining “person” with multiple defined terms). Philpot also complained (for the first time on appeal) that the charge did not contain definitions for those terms. The court of appeals affirmed. It emphasized the word “purports” in the definition of “forge” and held it was “immaterial” how PacPhil Bank is characterized. The majority also rejected the argument, raised by the dissent, that there could be no forgery because the cashier’s check was so obviously fake that it was “void on its face.” As for the charge error claim, the court held no actual harm was shown because, inter alia, the ordinary definition of “another” could have suggested a more limited definition than what the statute provides.

Philpot reurges his complaints and adopts the dissent’s. He adds that calling the characterization of PacPhil Bank “immaterial” renders the statutorily defined terms meaningless. Dispensing with that element results in a conviction without proof of all the elements of the offense.