Dudas, John Richard

Dudas stabbed a transient person during a fight, killing him.  At his murder trial, Dudas received an instruction on self-defense.  He also requested a necessity instruction.  In Bowen v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals said that the existence of self-defense did not foreclose necessity’s availability as a matter of law.  162 S.W.3d 226, 229-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The trial court denied the necessity instruction.  The jury rejected his self-defense claim and convicted him of murder.

The court of appeals affirmed.  It agreed with the numerous courts of appeals that distinguish Bowen because that case did not involve deadly force.  When deadly force is used, these courts hold, “allowing an instruction on necessity when the appellant used deadly force and obtained a jury instruction on self-defense would undermine the legislative purpose of limiting the justifiable use of deadly force to preventing an immediate threat to one’s life or preventing the commission of specific violent crimes.”  Chase v. State, 666 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023) (emphasis in original).  See  Tex. Penal Code § 9.22(3) (“Conduct is justified if . . . a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.”).  

Dudas asks the Court to reconcile these cases with Bowen.  He argues 1) the deadly force and necessity statutes have different elements, and 2) the former does not explicitly preclude necessity “on its face,” citing Bowen.