Coleman, Christopher Tye
6-11-25
State represented by SPA
“Does a Special Ranger commit impersonation and have the requisite intent to violate Tex. Pen. Code § 37.11 when arriving in his designated uniform while assuming he had authority to conduct an investigatory interview?”
A Texas & Southwest Cattle Raisers Association (TSCRA) Special Ranger investigated whether Coleman was engaged in a sexual relationship with a child. During the investigation, the Ranger obtained inculpatory statements from Coleman and recovered child pornography from his phone. Coleman was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography and lewd material.
Coleman moved to suppress, arguing that the Ranger lacked legal authority to investigate. He relied on two statutes: Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.023(b), which authorizes Special Rangers to enforce laws “designed to protect life and property,” and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.125(b), which limits their law enforcement powers to “prevent or abate the commission of an offense involving livestock or related property.” The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress, concluding the Ranger acted outside his lawful authority.
On appeal, the State argued that Coleman lacked standing to contest the Ranger’s authority. In response, Coleman invoked Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23, contending that the evidence was obtained unlawfully by a “person”—namely, the Ranger—who violated Tex. Penal Code § 37.11 by impersonating a public servant. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the Ranger intended to induce cooperation through pretended official authority. The record showed the Ranger wore a TSCRA badge, dressed like a law enforcement officer, described his law enforcement experience, and told Coleman he was “still a police officer.” Coleman understood the Ranger’s visit related to the child sexual abuse allegations.
The State contends that the Ranger qualified as a “public servant” under Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(41)(F), which includes anyone “performing a governmental function under a claim of right,” even if the individual is “not legally qualified to do so.” Thus, even if the Ranger ultimately lacked legal authority, his assertion of authority was based on a colorable claim of right. Moreover, the State contends that the offense requires the actor to be aware that they lack the authority they purport to exercise—an element the record does not support here.