

No. _____

FILED
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
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DEANA WILLIAMSON, CLERK

To the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

The State of Texas, Petitioner

v.

John Christopher Foster, Respondent

From the Court of Appeals for the
Third Judicial District of Texas at Austin
Court of Appeals No. 03-17-00669-CR

Appeal from the 403rd Judicial District Court
Travis County, Texas
Cause Number D-1-DC-17-201020

STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

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Oral argument is requested

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To the Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals:

Now comes the State of Texas and files this petition, and in support thereof, respectfully shows the following:

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

The State requests oral argument. The court of appeals' decision conflicts with this Court's precedent regarding self-defense instructions. This Court should review and reverse the court of appeals' decision, and the written arguments and comparisons below may be more fully explored through oral argument.

Statement of the Case

A jury convicted John Foster of aggravated assault and assessed punishment at 17 years and six months' imprisonment.

Statement of Procedural History

On July 24, 2018, the Third Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing and remanding this case for a new trial. *See Foster v. State*, No. 03-17-00669-CR, 2018 WL 3543482 (Tex. App.—Austin July 24, 2018).

The State filed a motion for rehearing and a motion for en banc reconsideration on September 7, 2018. The court of appeals overruled those motions on November 27, 2018.

The State's petition for discretionary review was due on December 27, 2018. The State has filed a timely motion for extension of this deadline.

Questions Presented for Review

1. Is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when he testifies that he did not commit the charged offense and, at most, he admits to committing a separate lesser-included offense?
2. Does an appellate court correctly apply the standard of review for harm when it fails to consider significant evidence of guilt and the defensive theory put forth at trial, which was that the defendant did not commit the charged offense, not that he committed it in self-defense?

Statement of Facts

The charge

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault for causing serious bodily injury to Sarah Morris by pulling her hair and by cutting her with a knife.¹ CR 5, 86; *and see* Tex. Penal Code §22.02(b)(1), which makes aggravated assault a first degree felony if the defendant causes serious bodily injury to a person he has a dating relationship with and the defendant uses a deadly weapon.

Serious bodily injury

The evidence at trial showed that someone sliced off a large portion of the victim's scalp and that this wound met the legal definition of "serious bodily injury." 6RR 75, 97-99, 126; SX 13-16.²

There was evidence that the victim suffered other injuries as well, such as bruises and scratches and a small laceration to her chin, but there was no evidence that any of these injuries were "serious bodily injury." 6RR 88-89.

¹ The State abandoned other manners and means at trial, perhaps because there was no evidence that these caused "serious bodily injury."

² "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46).

The defendant's testimony

The defendant testified that he and Sarah got into an argument and he started packing a bag to leave. 7RR 98. He testified that he said some mean things to her, and she grabbed a knife off the counter and “started to cut her hair off.” 7RR 99. He testified that he did not think she was actually cutting her hair and that he was busy looking for his phone and packing his things. 7RR 99. He testified that he went to grab his bag, and when he came back into the living room, he saw that she had hair in her hands. 7RR 99. He testified that he laughed because he had no idea of the extent of the injury that she had “committed to herself.” 7RR 100.

He testified that he then made a sexual advance and Sarah defecated on herself to stop it. 7RR 100-101. Then he broke her computer. 7RR 101.

He testified that Sarah then attacked him with the knife and cut his neck and his side so he made the decision to defend himself at that time. 7RR 102. He testified that he struggled for the knife and that he struck Sarah and pulled her to the ground. 7RR 106. He testified that Sarah was holding the knife close to her, like a baseball bat, and that the knife cut her chin because she was holding it close to her chin. 7RR 107. He testified that he got on top of her and tried to claw at her hands to get the knife away from her. 7RR 108. He testified that he grabbed her by the neck and held her

down. 7RR 108. He testified that he was able to pry Sarah's hands loose and gain control of the knife and throw it away. 7RR 108. He testified that he screamed at her, she stopped fighting, and he let her up. 7RR 109.

At that point, Sarah ran to the neighbor's house for help, but the defendant testified that he did not want the police called because he had a warrant and he did not want to go to jail. 7RR 109. He claimed he waited at the neighbor's door for a minute or so and then grabbed Sarah's arm to coerce her back inside. 7RR 110. He testified that she yanked her arm away and then they went to separate bathrooms to clean up. 7RR 110.

On cross-examination, the defendant said Sarah's hair could have gotten cut while they were struggling for the knife because Sarah was holding it close, but "I did not scalp her" and "I did not cut her hair." 7RR 128-29.

After the State played a jail call where the defendant told his mother that he cut Sarah's hair, the defendant got back on the stand and testified that "some of her hair was cut in the struggle." 7RR 140, 144; SX 63. Defense counsel then asked, "Did you cut her hair with a knife?" The defendant answered, "Technically--," to which counsel directed him to answer "Just yes or no," and the defendant said, "Yes, it happened." 7RR 144.

Argument

First Question for Review: Is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense when he testifies that he did not commit the charged offense and, at most, he admits to committing a separate lesser-included offense?

Self-defense is a “confession and avoidance” defense, which means the defendant must admit to the charged offense to be entitled to an instruction. *Young v. State*, 991 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that, in order to raise a justification defense, “a defendant admits violating the statute under which he is charged and then offers [the defense] as a justification which weighs against imposing a criminal punishment for the acts or acts which violated the statute”); *Shaw v. State*, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“a defensive instruction is only appropriate when the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense”); *Juarez v. State*, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that the doctrine of confession and avoidance “requires an admission to the conduct”).

In the instant case, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. CR 5, 86; *and see* Tex. Penal Code §22.02(b)(1). Serious bodily injury was an element of the offense. Moreover, there was only one injury that resulted in serious bodily injury—

an injury on the back of the victim's head where a large portion of her scalp was sliced off. 6RR 75, 97-99, 126; SX 13-16.

The record shows that the defendant did not admit to the offense (aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury) or to the conduct (slicing off a portion of the victim's scalp). In fact, he explicitly denied it. 7RR 128 ("I did not scalp her"). More than that, he testified that the victim caused the scalp injury to herself while the defendant was busy looking for his cell phone and packing a bag to leave. 7RR 98-100. The defendant also testified that the victim caused the scalp injury *before* she attacked him with the knife, which means there is no way the defendant could have caused the scalp injury in self-defense during the struggle over the knife. 7RR 100-08, 144.

In short, the defendant did not admit to the charged offense or to the conduct, so he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.

The court of appeals improperly plucked statements out of the record and examined them in a vacuum to reach its conclusion that the defendant admitted to the offense.

The court of appeals held that the defendant "arguably admitted" to causing the scalp injury. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *6. To reach this holding, the court of appeals plucked out the defendant's testimony that the

victim's hair and chin were cut during the struggle over the knife, and it disregarded the defendant's unequivocal testimony that *he did not cause the scalp injury*. 7RR 128 ("I did not scalp her"). It also disregarded his testimony that *Sarah caused the scalp injury to herself* while he was busy packing. 7RR 98-100. It also disregarded his testimony that Sarah caused the scalp injury *before the struggle over the knife*, which means there is no way he could have caused the scalp injury during the struggle, even if he did cut her at that time. 7RR 100-02. Finally, the court of appeals disregarded the fact that the defendant's admission that the victim's *hair* and *chin* were cut is not the same as an admission to cutting off a large portion of the victim's *scalp*.

Plucking testimony out of the record and examining it in a vacuum is improper. *Cf. McRay v. State*, No. 05-05-00286-CR, 2006 WL 874118 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2006, no pet.) (refusing to look at a portion of the record in a vacuum, and finding that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction when he denied committing the offense); *and cf. Ritcherson v. State*, No. PD-0021-17, 2018 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1208, at *22 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2018) (explaining that the appellate court should not pluck statements out of the record and examine them in a

vacuum in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense).

The State asks this Court to grant discretionary review because the court of appeals' decision improperly plucks some testimony out of the record and examines it in a vacuum and, unless this Court grants review, future courts may likewise err.

The court of appeals erred in concluding that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction based on his admission to a separate lesser-included offense.

The court of appeals held that, even assuming the defendant did not admit to causing the scalp injury, he was still entitled to a self-defense instruction based on his testimony that the victim's hair and chin were cut during the struggle over the knife. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *6.

But there is no evidence that these cuts caused serious bodily injury, which is an element of the charged offense, so these cuts could not be the basis for the charged offense—first degree felony aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. *See* Tex. Penal Code §22.02(b)(1). At most, the defendant admitted to committing a separate lesser-included offense—e.g., the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but without serious bodily injury. *See* Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(b).

But he did not admit to committing the offense with which he was charged, so he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction.

It is true (as noted in the court of appeals' opinion) that whether an injury constitutes "serious bodily injury" is a question of fact for the jury to decide. But there must be some evidence in the record to support such a finding. In this case, there was no evidence that these cuts caused serious bodily injury—which was an element of the offense—so there is no way these injuries could be the basis for the offense.

Finally, it is true (as noted in the court of appeals' opinion) that the defendant does not necessarily have to admit to the State's version of events or to every element of the offense. *Gamino v. State*, 537 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). But he still must "sufficiently admit to the commission of the offense" in order to be entitled to a self-defense instruction. *Id.* For example, in *Gamino*, the defendant did not admit to the element of threatening the victim, but the threat could be inferred from his testimony that he drew his gun and told the victim to "Get back, leave us alone." *Id.*

Here, by contrast, the defendant did not admit to the element of causing serious bodily injury, and this element could not be inferred from his testimony (like in *Gamino*) because the defendant *explicitly denied* causing

the serious bodily injury in this case. More than that, he claimed that the victim caused the serious bodily injury to herself, and that she did so before any defensive struggle began, so there is no way the defendant could have caused the serious bodily injury during the struggle, even if he did cut the victim at that time.

In sum, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. He did not admit to the offense with which he was charged, so he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Moreover, an admission to committing a separate lesser-included offense (i.e., causing other cuts to the victim during the struggle that did not cause serious bodily injury) does not entitle him to a self-defense instruction on the charged offense, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.

The State asks this Court to grant discretionary review because the court of appeals' decision conflicts with controlling precedent that requires the defendant to admit to the offense in order to be entitled to an instruction on self-defense and, unless this Court grants review, future courts may likewise err. The State also asks this Court to grant discretionary review to clarify that *Gamino* does not mean that a defendant—who denies committing the offense—is entitled to a self-defense instruction based on an admission to a separate lesser-included offense.

Second Question for Review: Does an appellate court correctly apply the standard of review for harm when it fails to consider significant evidence of guilt and the defensive theory put forth at trial, which was that the defendant did not commit the charged offense, not that he committed it in self-defense?

The standard for harm requires the appellate court to consider the totality of the record, including the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. *Cornet v. State*, 417 S.W.3d 446, 449-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial record must demonstrate that there is some actual harm before the case can be reversed and remanded for a new trial. *Id.*

The court of appeals erred in finding that the jury charge weighed in favor of a finding of harm.

The court of appeals' opinion found that the jury charge weighed in favor of a finding of harm because the jury was not given the opportunity to consider self-defense and thus had no option of acquitting the defendant in light of his admissions. The opinion then cited to a case where self-defense was the only defensive theory, making the defendant's conviction a virtual inevitability in light of his confession to the offense. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *7.

It is true that the lack of a self-defense instruction is generally harmful because its omission leaves the jury without a vehicle by which to acquit a

defendant who has admitted to all the elements of the offense. *Cornet*, 417 S.W.3d at 451.

But the defendant in this case *did not* admit to all of the elements of the offense. He never admitted to causing serious bodily injury. In fact, he specifically denied causing the serious bodily injury in this case. Thus, this is not a case where conviction was a virtual inevitability in light of the defendant's confession to the offense.

Additionally, self-defense was not the only vehicle by which the jury could acquit the defendant in this case. To the contrary, the defendant testified that he did not commit the offense. When looking at the defendant's testimony from trial, it is clear that this is not a self-defense case. This is an "I didn't do it" case. As such, the defendant was not harmed by the lack of a self-defense instruction.

Moreover, the jury charge instructed the jury to acquit if the jurors had a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant caused serious bodily injury. CR 86-87. Thus, the jury would have acquitted if they had even a reasonable doubt about what happened based on the defendant's testimony. The fact that the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury shows that they did not have a

reasonable doubt, which means they did not believe the defendant's version of events, so the failure to include a self-defense instruction was harmless.

In sum, the first factor weighs in favor of a finding of no harm in light of the defendant's actual defense (that he did not cause the scalp injury) and the jury charge (which instructed the jury to acquit if the jurors had a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant caused serious bodily injury).

The court of appeals erred in finding that the arguments of counsel seemed to weigh in favor of a finding of harm.

The court of appeals' opinion found that the arguments "would seem to" weigh in favor of a finding of harm because defense counsel raised self-defense in his opening statement and closing argument. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *7.

It is true that defense counsel raised self-defense in opening, stating that the evidence would show that the defendant was cut first and was fighting to protect his life. Perhaps self-defense was initially intended to be their defensive theory, but it was no longer a viable theory once the defendant testified that Sarah caused the scalp injury to herself before she attacked him with a knife.

It is also true that defense counsel mentioned self-defense in closing argument, but what he actually said was that self-defense was not in the charge because “we can’t claim self-defense for something that we claim we did not do.” 7RR 175. This is a far cry from being deprived of their only defensive theory. To the contrary, counsel argued that self-defense was *not* their defensive theory and that their theory was that the defendant did not do it.

Defense counsel also argued that “the sole issue is who scalped [Sarah].” 7RR 178. Again, this argument does not jibe with a theory of self-defense, but it does go with their actual defensive theory, which was that the defendant did not cause the scalp injury.

In sum, the defensive theory was not self-defense. It was that the defendant did not commit the offense. This is clear from his testimony and counsel’s arguments, and thus, the defendant was not harmed by the lack of a self-defense instruction.

The court of appeals’ opinion also found harm in the State’s closing argument because it referenced the defendant’s admission to cutting Sarah (i.e., his admission to cutting her chin and hair in the struggle over the knife). *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *7. But the State’s point was not that the defendant should be convicted based on this testimony, but rather that

his testimony was inconsistent and untrue. 7RR 183. Moreover, the State never asked the jury to convict based on the defendant's admission to cutting Sarah's chin and hair in a struggle. The State focused exclusively on the scalp injury in asking the jury to convict. 7RR 171, 181-82. Indeed, there is no way the jury could have convicted based on the defendant's admission to cutting Sarah's chin or hair during the struggle because there was no evidence that these cuts caused serious bodily injury, an element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court of appeals' opinion also noted that the parties spent a lot of time on self-defense in voir dire. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *8. But this was ultimately irrelevant because the defendant testified that he did not cause the scalp injury (not that he caused the injury in self-defense).

In sum, the court of appeals ignored the fact that no one argued that the cuts to Sarah's chin and hair could be the basis for this offense. It ignored the fact that the parties focused exclusively on the scalp injury. And it ignored the fact that the defendant's defensive theory was that he did not commit the offense, not that he did it in self-defense. For all of these reasons, the defendant was not harmed by the lack of a self-defense instruction.

The court of appeals erred in finding that the entirety of the evidence weighed in favor of a finding of harm.

The court of appeals' opinion found that this factor weighed in favor of a finding of harm, emphasizing that the defendant admitted in his testimony to injuring Sarah (i.e., the cuts to her chin and hair during the struggle over the knife), that the detective noted that the defendant may have had defensive wounds to his hands, that Sarah expressed concern that she would be charged for her conduct, and that the defendant said, in a recorded jail call, that Sarah held a knife to his throat. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *8.

But the court of appeals' opinion ignored the fact that there was no evidence indicating that the cuts to Sarah's chin and hair caused serious bodily injury. It ignored the fact that the scalp injury is the only serious bodily injury in this case, and thus, the only injury that the offense could be based on. It ignored the fact that the defendant testified that he did not cause the scalp injury. 7RR 128 ("I did not scalp her"). It ignored the fact that the defendant testified that Sarah caused the scalp injury to herself. 7RR 99-100. It ignored the fact that the defendant testified that Sarah caused the scalp injury *before* the struggle over the knife, which means there is no way the defendant could have caused the injury during the struggle. 7RR 100-02. Again, when looking at the defendant's actual

testimony from trial, it is clear that this is not a self-defense case. This is an “I didn’t do it” case. As such, the defendant was not harmed by the lack of a self-defense instruction.

Additionally, the court of appeals noted that there was evidence “significantly undermining” the defendant’s claim of self-defense, but it did not discuss this evidence or adequately take it into account. *Foster*, 2018 WL 3543482, at *8. This evidence should have been discussed and taken into account.

First and foremost is the victim’s testimony. Sarah testified that she was upset because she had just lost her job, and she decided to take a bath. The defendant brought two knives into the bathroom and told her that she should kill herself. 7RR 21.

While Sarah was taking a bath, the defendant realized that he could not find his phone. Sarah tried to help him find it, and he screamed at her. 7RR 22. He broke her laptop, then he left the house and she locked all the doors. 7RR 22-23.

A couple minutes later, the defendant busted in the front door and began to beat and strangle Sarah. 7RR 23-25. Sarah thought she was going to die. 7RR 25. She tried to run to a neighbor for help when the defendant let up, but he followed her and drug her back inside. 7RR 26.

Sarah testified that the defendant then cut off her hair with a serrated knife, and it was extremely painful. 7RR 27-28. Sarah later realized he had cut the back of her head (i.e., the scalp injury). 7RR 31.

Sarah was able to grab the knife from the defendant, and she held it to his neck, but the defendant laughed and got control of the knife again. 7RR 28-29. He held the knife to her neck and told her he was going to kill her. 7RR 29-30.

Sarah realized that she had defecated on herself, and she begged the defendant to let her take a bath. 7RR 30. The defendant let her, but he sat by the bathroom door with the knife so she could not leave. 7RR 30-31.

The defendant was intoxicated, and he passed out. 7RR 32. Sarah grabbed the knife, plus the other two knives from when the defendant told her she should kill herself, and put them in the bathtub with her. 7RR 32. The police arrived shortly thereafter. 7RR 33.

In addition to the victim's testimony, there was extensive corroborating evidence, including—

- Graphic pictures and testimony from multiple witnesses detailing Sarah's injuries. 6RR 44, 75, 85, 88-89, 122-26, 129; 7RR 80; SX 8-38, 56-61.

- Pictures and testimony describing the blood, hair, and feces throughout Sarah's house, as well as the knives in the bathtub. 6RR 39, 45-49, 139-46; SX 2-6, 44-48, 51-53.
- Pictures of Sarah's busted-in front door. 6RR 139, 143-44; SX 42-43.
- Pictures of Sarah's broken computer. SX 49-50.
- A neighbor's 911 call reporting that Sarah was "banging on my door to open it because he's beating her" and that the neighbor could hear Sarah "screaming, pleading to stop." SX 1.
- A picture of Sarah's blood on the neighbor's door. 6RR 143; SX 41.
- Testimony from Sarah's mother that she was talking to Sarah on the phone that night, that Sarah said she was afraid and that the defendant was bullying and harassing her, then the call "went dead," then her mother got a text from Sarah that said "I'm okay," but her mother could not reach Sarah by phone again. 7RR 78-79.
- Testimony from Sarah that she did not send the "I'm okay" text. 7RR 72.
- Testimony that Sarah's phone and keys were found in the defendant's jacket pocket. 7RR 35; 80-81.

- Testimony that the defendant had long hairs stuck underneath his fingernails. 6RR 42.
- Testimony that defecation indicates a pretty severe strangulation where the victim needs medical attention immediately. 6RR 194.
- Testimony from Sarah and her mother about prior assaults committed by the defendant. 7RR 10-14, 76.
- Testimony from the paramedic that responded to this assault that he had responded to another assault by the defendant against Sarah just one week before. 6RR 90; 7RR 33-34.
- Testimony that the defendant repeatedly called Sarah after the assault to tell her that this would never happen again and that she needed to recant her statement and say the assault never happened. 7RR 38, 71.
- The defendant's statement that he caused the cut to his throat himself by pushing the knife into his throat. 7RR 141.

In sum, the court of appeals erred because it did not consider the entire record, including significant evidence of guilt, and it did not take into account the actual defensive theory put forth at trial, which was that the defendant did not commit the charged offense, not that he committed it in self-defense. This is not a self-defense case. This is an "I didn't do it" case.

As such, the defendant was not harmed by the lack of a self-defense instruction, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.

The State asks this Court to grant discretionary review because the court of appeals incorrectly applied the standard of review for harm and, unless this Court grants review, future courts may similarly err.

Prayer

The State asks this Court to grant discretionary review of this petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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Certificate of Compliance and Service

I certify that this petition contains 4,454 words, excepting contents that may be excluded per Rule 9.4(i)(1). I further certify that, on January 9, 2019, a true and correct copy of this petition was served through the electronic filing manager on:

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APPENDIX

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-17-00669-CR

John Christopher Foster, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

**FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-DC-17-201020, HONORABLE BRENDA KENNEDY, JUDGE PRESIDING**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John Christopher Foster was charged with aggravated assault family violence for allegedly assaulting Sarah Morris, who Foster had a dating relationship with at the time, and for using a deadly weapon during the offense. *See* Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01(a) (listing elements of offense of assault), .02(a)-(b)(1) (providing that defendant commits aggravated assault if he “causes serious bodily injury to another” and that offense is first-degree felony if defendant uses deadly weapon “and causes serious bodily injury to a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by” provisions of Family Code). During the trial, Foster requested a jury instruction on self-defense, but the district court denied that request. At the end of the guilt-or-innocence phase, the jury found Foster guilty of the charged offense and also found that Foster used a deadly weapon during the offense. At the end of the punishment phase, the jury assessed Foster’s punishment at seventeen years and six months’ imprisonment. *See id.* § 12.32 (listing punishment

range for first-degree felony). The district court rendered its judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdicts. In two issues on appeal, Foster argues that the district court erred by denying his request for an instruction on self-defense and by failing to convene a hearing on his motion for new trial. We will reverse the district court's judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

As set out above, Foster was charged with aggravated assault family violence. Originally, the indictment alleged that Foster assaulted Morris by "intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caus[ing] serious bodily injury to . . . Morris" in the following different ways: (1) "by grabbing . . . Morris with his hand," (2) "by squeezing . . . Morris with his hand," (3) "by striking . . . Morris with his hand," (4) "by pulling . . . Morris'[s] hair," and (5) "by cutting . . . Morris with a knife." The indictment also alleged that Foster committed the assault while using and exhibiting a deadly weapon (a knife). After the various witnesses testified at trial, the State abandoned the first three alternative assault allegations. Consistent with the remaining allegations, the jury charge instructed the jury to find Foster guilty if they determined that Foster "cause[d] serious bodily injury to . . . Morris . . . by . . . pulling . . . Morris'[s] hair[] or . . . cutting . . . Morris with a knife."

During the trial, Foster, Morris, Morris's neighbor, several medical personnel, and numerous law-enforcement officials testified. In addition, photographs of Morris's home and of injuries that Morris and Foster allegedly sustained were admitted into evidence. The photographs of Morris's home show blood, clumps of hair, and feces in several rooms. The photographs of Morris showed significant injuries to her face and head, including an injury to her scalp. Two photographs

taken of Foster on the day of the offense showed lacerations on his neck, and a photograph taken well after the offense purportedly showed a scar from an injury to Foster's armpit.

Furthermore, recordings of phone conversations between Foster and two individuals occurring while he was in jail and of a 911 call made by Morris's neighbor were admitted into evidence. On the recording of the 911 call, Morris's neighbor stated that Foster was beating Morris, that Morris knocked on the neighbor's door for help, and that the neighbor could hear Morris screaming and pleading with Foster to stop. On the recordings of the phone conversations from jail, Foster stated that he took a knife away from Morris after she held the knife to his throat, that his throat was cut when he pushed against the knife, that he cut his hand in the process, and that he cut Morris's hair.

During her testimony, Morris explained that Foster had assaulted her throughout their relationship by punching her in the face and that this occurred as recently as one week before the incident in question. Regarding the day of the alleged offense, Morris explained that Foster brought two knives to her before she was going to take a bath and told her how to kill herself, that he started yelling at her about the fact that he could not find his cell phone, that he left her home, and that she locked the door when he left. In addition, Morris related that Foster returned a few minutes later, "busted [the front door] open" while she was still in the living room, "start[ed] punching" her in the face, and strangled her neck with two hands. Further, Morris recalled that she felt her life "slipping away" while she was being strangled, that she thought she "was going to die," that she could not breathe, and that she "defecated [her]self" at some point.

Next, Morris explained that Foster stopped choking her to continue looking for his phone and that, at that point, she ran to her neighbor's house. Moreover, Morris stated that Foster grabbed her "by [her] hair and drag[ged her] back into the house," that he used a knife "to cut off [her] hair," that she fought for the knife and cut her hands during the struggle, that she held the knife to his neck and told him to stop, that Foster started laughing and regained possession of the knife, and that Foster said he was going to kill her. Additionally, Morris testified that she asked Foster to let her take a bath to clean herself, that Foster agreed but stated that he would stay in the bathroom with her and hold onto the knife, that Foster passed out because he was intoxicated, that she grabbed the knives and placed them in the bathtub, that the police showed up shortly thereafter, and that she left the home when the police arrived. Further, Morris specifically denied attacking Foster first.

In addition to Morris testifying, the State called Officer Matthew Murphy to the stand to discuss his observations on the night in question when he responded to a 911 call concerning Morris. Officer Murphy related that he first noticed blood on the front porch and doorframe, that he went inside the residence and saw more blood and also clumps of hair in the living room, that he observed Foster unconscious in the hallway with blood on his hand, that Foster "had long hairs stuck underneath" his fingernails, and that Foster "had some lacerations to his neck." Next, Officer Murphy recalled that he heard Morris call for help; that "she had swelling, discoloration, and blood covering the majority of her face"; that some of her hair was missing; that she had a laceration on her head; and that she had "red marks on her neck." When describing the extent of Morris's injuries, Officer Murphy stated that Morris had "significant swelling to the majority of her face" causing one of her eyes to be nearly swollen shut and that a large "area of skin . . . was completely missing

from her scalp.” In addition, Officer Murphy testified that he found “two, possibly more, knives” in the bathtub.¹

Following Officer Murphy’s testimony, a paramedic, David Curvin, was called to the stand to discuss his treatment of Morris. Regarding Morris’s injuries, Curvin explained that she had swelling to both eyes, had bruising on her face, had lacerations to her throat and left hand, had bruises on her knees, and “had an area on the back of her head where somebody had sliced a large portion of her scalp off.” Regarding the last injury, Curvin explained that if the wound was not treated, it “could [have] become infected” and “could eventually [have] kill[ed] the patient.” In addition, Curvin related that Morris told him that she had been “repeatedly struck with fists and the butt or handle of a knife” and that Foster tried to cut her hair off. When discussing the injuries to Morris’s left hand, Curvin discussed how Morris told him that she injured her hand when “trying to get the knife away from” Foster and when “fighting off [Foster] . . . with his knife.” Moreover, Curvin testified that Morris stated that Foster choked her to the point where she “almost passed out,” that she was so scared during the incident that she defecated on herself, and that she thought that Foster “was going to kill” her.²

Next, the State called Detective Alfonso Anderson to the stand, and he testified that he went to the scene of the offense and spoke with Foster and Morris. When discussing his conversation with Foster, Detective Anderson related that Foster had long but “very superficial”

¹ Testimony similar to that of Officer Murphy’s was given by Officer Matthew Hootman, who also responded to the scene on the night in question.

² One of the nurses who treated Morris on the night in question, Kimberly Conklin, was called to the stand and provided similar testimony regarding the extent and nature of Morris’s injuries.

“scratch marks along his throat,” that Foster’s hands looked swollen, and that Foster had cuts on his fingers. Regarding the injuries to Foster’s hands, Detective Anderson stated that swollen hands can be a sign that the person has hit something with his hands, but Detective Anderson also testified that some of the injuries might have been defensive in nature. Additionally, Detective Anderson discussed how when he talked with Morris, she stated that she gathered the knives and placed them in the tub to hide them because she was afraid Foster was going to kill her. Further, Detective Anderson testified that Morris stated that Foster tripped her, got on top of her, punched her, and strangled her for two minutes, and Detective Anderson recalled that Morris also recounted that she defecated when she was being strangled, that Foster let her go for a moment, that she ran to her neighbor’s home seeking help, that Foster brought her back to the house, that Foster picked up a knife, that Foster started “cutting her hair off,” that he held the knife to her throat, and that he threatened to kill her. In addition, Detective Anderson recalled that Morris initially expressed concern that she might be charged for cutting Foster’s neck.³

During his case in chief, Foster elected to testify and was called to the stand two times. In his first appearance on the stand, Foster admitted that he was seeing another woman and testified that on the night before the alleged offense, Morris wanted him to watch her have sex with another man to punish him for the affair. Further, Foster stated that he decided to leave Morris’s home but that before he left, Morris grabbed his stuff and tackled him in the front yard in order to keep him from leaving. Regarding the day of the offense, Foster related that they had sexual

³ In his testimony, Detective Anderson provided testimony similar to that given by other witnesses describing the scene and Morris’s injuries.

intercourse but started to argue afterwards. When describing the argument, Foster recalled that he was “being a jerk to her” by saying “mean” things, that she threatened to kill herself, that she grabbed a knife, and that she “started to cut her hair off.” Next, Foster recalled that Morris attacked him by cutting his neck, hand, and armpit with a knife.

Additionally, Foster testified that he defended himself because he believed that Morris was going to kill him, that they struggled for the knife, that she was holding the knife very close to herself, and that she sustained injuries from the knife during their struggle to get control of the knife. Regarding those injuries, Foster related that the knife made contact with Morris’s body more than once resulting in a cut to her chin. When asked about some of the injuries to Morris’s head, Foster denied “scalp[ing] her” but stated that “her hair could have gotten cut” during their struggle because she was holding the knife “close to her.” In addition, Foster stated that he hit her and tried to hold her down by the neck when trying to get the knife, that he gained control of the knife, and that he threw the knife away. Finally, he denied assaulting her in the past but admitted that he hit her a couple of times after she hit him first.

After Foster finished testifying the first time, the district court stated that Foster “messed up [his] self-defense” because, according to the district court, the indictment charged Foster “with stabbing [Morris] with a knife and cutting her hair off,” “because [he had] to admit to the conduct” to get the instruction, and because Foster did not admit to committing the charged conduct. Following that exchange, Foster was called to the stand again. In his testimony, Foster admitted that he cut Morris’s “hair with a knife” during “the struggle.”

Following his second round of testimony, Foster again requested an instruction on self-defense in light of the district court's prior explanation for why Morris was not entitled to a self-defense instruction and in light of Morris's subsequent testimony admitting to cutting Morris's hair with a knife. In response, the district court denied the request and stated that Foster's admission that he cut Morris's hair was "not enough" because Foster did not testify that he cut her hair in response to her aggression.

After the jury charge was prepared and after the jury considered the evidence presented during the trial, the jury found Foster guilty of the charged offense.

DISCUSSION

In his first issue on appeal, Foster contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense. In his second issue on appeal, Foster argues that the district court erred by failing to convene a hearing on his motion for new trial. Given our resolution of Foster's first issue on appeal, we need not reach the second issue.

Self-Defense Instruction

As indicated above, Foster contends that there was error in the jury charge. When reviewing an alleged jury-charge error, appellate courts first determine whether error exists and then, if so, ascertain whether the resulting harm is sufficient to warrant a reversal. *See Price v. State*, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); *Ngo v. State*, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The amount of harm needed for a reversal depends on whether a complaint regarding "that error was preserved in the trial court." *Swearingen v. State*, 270 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Austin

2008, pet. ref'd). If the defendant made a timely objection, reversal is required if there has been “some harm.” *Almanza v. State*, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g). However, if no objection was made, a reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in “egregious harm.” *See Neal v. State*, 256 S.W.3d 264, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

During trial, Foster requested an instruction on self-defense. “Self-defense is a justification for otherwise unlawful conduct.” *Torres v. State*, 7 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). Under the Penal Code, “a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(a). “‘Reasonable belief’ means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” *Id.* § 1.07(a)(42).

When determining whether a defensive instruction should have been provided, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested” instruction. *Bufkin v. State*, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In general, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a defensive issue if the defensive issue “is raised by the evidence, regardless of the strength or credibility of that evidence.” *Farmer v. State*, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). However, an instruction “is not required” if the evidence “does not establish the defense.” *Williams v. State*, Nos. 03-14-00228—00229-CR, 2016 WL 370019, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “A defendant’s testimony alone may be enough to require a self defense instruction.” *Maxwell v. State*, No. 03-06-00473-CR, 2007 WL 2274883, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2007, pet. struck) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). “A trial court errs in denying a self defense instruction if there is some evidence, from any source, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that will support the elements of self defense.” *Gamino v. State*, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “Whether a defense is supported by the evidence is a sufficiency question reviewable on appeal as a question of law.” *Shaw v. State*, 243 S.W.3d 647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“In determining whether a defense is thus supported, a court must rely on its own judgment, formed in the light of its own common sense and experience, as to the limits of rational inference from the facts proven.” *Id.* “[W]hen the defensive evidence merely negates the necessary culpable mental state, it will not suffice to entitle the defendant to a defensive instruction.” *Id.* at 659. “Rather, a defensive instruction is only appropriate when the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense *including* the culpable mental state, but interposes the justification to excuse the otherwise criminal conduct.” *Id.*; *see also Juarez v. State*, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that doctrine of confession and avoidance “requires an admission to the conduct, which includes both the act or omission and the requisite mental state”). However, “[a]dmitting to the conduct does not necessarily mean admitting to every element of the offense.” *Gamino*, 537 S.W.3d at 512. “For example, a defendant” can essentially admit to the commission of murder but still deny “an intent to kill.” *Id.*

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Foster’s requested instruction, evidence was presented during the trial indicating that Morris had physically tackled Foster on the day before the alleged offense; that Morris initiated an assault on the day in question by using a knife to cut Foster on his neck, hand, and armpit; and that Morris expressed concern that she might be

charged for the injuries that she inflicted on Foster. In addition, photographs were admitted into evidence showing that Foster had a laceration on his neck on the night in question and showing that Foster had a scar near his armpit. Furthermore, Foster testified that he believed that Morris was going to try and kill him and decided to try to take the knife from Morris by wrestling it away from her. Additionally, Foster admitted that as a result of that struggle, Morris sustained cuts to various parts of her body.

In its brief, the State asserts that the evidence summarized above is insufficient to have warranted a self-defense instruction because Foster “did not admit to scalping” Morris, which the State urges Foster was required to do in order to be entitled to an instruction. As support for this proposition, the State notes that Foster was charged with aggravated assault, which requires proof of serious bodily injury, *see* Tex. Penal Code § 22.02 (providing that person commits aggravated assault by committing assault that “causes serious bodily injury to another”), and urges that “the only injury that qualified as ‘serious bodily injury’” based on testimony given at trial “was an injury on the back of [Morris]’s head where someone sliced off a large portion of her scalp,” *see also id.* § 1.07(a)(46) (defining “[s]erious bodily injury” as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ”).⁴

⁴ As support for these arguments, the State primarily relies on two prior opinions from this Court. *See Guzman v. State*, No. 03-13-00131-CR, 2015 WL 2400238 (Tex. App.—Austin May 13, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); *Maxwell v. State*, No. 03-06-00473-CR, 2007 WL 2274883 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2007, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In both of those cases, the defendants admitted to some conduct, but they both denied that their actions injured the alleged victims. *See Guzman*, 2015 WL 2400238, at *11 (observing that “although appellant admitted that he struggled with Gay for the gun, he did not admit that he

As an initial matter, we note that the indictment did not allege that Foster caused an injury to Morris's scalp; rather, the indictment asserted alternative means in which Foster allegedly committed aggravated assault, including cutting Morris with a knife. Moreover, as described above, Foster admitted that as a result of his struggle to get the knife away from Morris, Morris sustained cuts from the knife, including cuts to her chin and to "her hair." Accordingly, although his testimony is inconsistent, Foster admitted to the criminal conduct alleged in the indictment of cutting Morris with a knife and arguably admitted to causing an injury to her scalp. *Cf. Miller v. State*, 312 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (explaining that determination regarding whether injury constitutes serious bodily injury is "a question of fact for the jury to decide").

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that Foster did not admit to causing the injury to Morris's scalp that served as the focus for much of the testimony presented at trial, that would not compel a conclusion that Foster was not entitled to a self-defense instruction in the circumstances present here, particularly where Foster did admit, consistent with the charges presented in the indictment, that his actions resulted in Morris being cut with a knife. On the contrary, the court of criminal appeals has indicated that a defendant is "not required to concede the State's version of the events' in order to be entitled to a self defense instruction." *See Gamino*,

committed the assaultive conduct alleged" because he "repeatedly denied ever hitting or kicking Gay, adamantly maintained that he did not cause her injuries, asserted that the injuries were self-inflicted by Gay, and suggested that the injuries were caused by other objects (such as the mailboxes) during their struggle over the gun"); *Maxwell*, 2007 WL 2274883, at *2 (noting that "although Maxwell admitted that he struggled for a gun, he did not admit that he fired the gun or that he fired the shot that killed Ramirez"). In contrast, in this case, although his testimony was inconsistent, Foster did admit that his actions resulted in Morris being cut multiple times with a knife when he struggled with Morris in order to take the knife away from her, and the indictment in this case alleged that Foster cut Morris with a knife.

537 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting *Gamino v. State*, 480 S.W.3d 80, 88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015), *aff'd*, 537 S.W.3d 507). Moreover, opinions by our sister courts of appeals have also indicated that if a defendant admits to using force against an alleged victim, as provided under the self-defense provision of the Penal Code, *see* Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(a), he should not “be denied the defense simply because he refused to admit to using the type of force alleged by the State,” *see Holloman v. State*, 948 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (commenting that “[i]t would be nonsensical to prohibit the defendant from claiming self-defense” if he admitted to using force in manner different from that alleged in indictment); *see also Hubbard v. State*, 133 S.W.3d 797, 801-02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d) (stating that “even if a defendant denies the specific allegations in the indictment, he or she is not necessarily precluded from raising defensive issues as long as he or she sufficiently admits conduct underlying the offense and provides evidence justifying a defensive instruction”); *Torres*, 7 S.W.3d at 716 (determining that defendant raised issue of self-defense even though he denied “intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to” his wife because he admitted “to grabbing his wife by her hair, possibly hitting her in the face . . . , struggling with her, and pushing her away”).

In light of the preceding and given the standard by which we are required to review this type of alleged jury-charge error, we conclude that evidence was presented that Foster reasonably believed that his use of force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Morris’s use of unlawful force and conclude that the district court erred by not submitting a self-defense instruction. *Cf. Alonzo v. State*, 353 S.W.3d 778, 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (determining that testimony from defendant that victim “attacked him with . . . a metal object, that the two engaged in a struggle,”

that victim grabbed spike, that victim attacked defendant with spike, that they struggled for control of spike, and that next thing defendant knew was that victim had “a hole in his chest” that “must have happened during the struggle” when they “were so close fighting” was sufficient “to raise the issue of self-defense”); *VanBrackle v. State*, 179 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (noting that “[w]hether the events in question actually transpired in the manner described by the defensive testimony and whether appellant’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances are fact issues to be determined by a jury”).

Having determined that there was error in the jury charge, we must now determine whether Foster was harmed by the error. As set out above, Foster’s request for the instruction was denied by the district court, and we, accordingly, assess whether Foster suffered some harm by the omission. See *Jiminez v. State*, 953 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. ref’d). In this type of analysis, reviewing courts “consider: (1) the jury charge as a whole, (2) the arguments of counsel, (3) the entirety of the evidence, and (4) other relevant factors present in the record.” *Reeves v. State*, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Although the standard is less stringent than the analysis performed when an objection is not made, the reviewing court must still “find that the defendant ‘suffered some actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm from the error.’” *Id.* (quoting *Warner v. State*, 245 S.W.3d 458, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). If there has been an objection, a reversal is warranted when the error is “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant.” *Id.* (quoting *Almanza*, 686 S.W.2d at 171). “In other words, a properly preserved error will require reversal as long as the error is not harmless.” *Gamino*, 480 S.W.3d at 90.

Moreover, we note that the absence of a confession-and-avoidance-defense instruction “is generally harmful because its omission leaves the jury without a vehicle by which to acquit a defendant who has admitted to all the elements of the offense.” *Cornet v. State*, 417 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); *see also id.* (stating that “[i]n general, when there is a single offense tried before a jury, it is impossible to determine how a jury would have weighed the credibility of the evidence on a defensive issue, and, therefore, appellate courts have reversed convictions in order to permit the jury to decide whether it believes the defensive evidence”). In addition, we note that if the issue of self-defense is raised by the evidence, the State has the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” *VanBrackle*, 179 S.W.3d at 717 (citing Tex. Penal Code § 2.03(d)). In other words, “[h]ad the jury in this cause been properly instructed, it needed only to have a reasonable doubt as to whether [Foster]’s actions were justified by self-defense to render an acquittal.” *Id.*

Turning to the first factor, the district court denied Foster’s request for an instruction on self-defense. As a result, the jury was not given the opportunity to consider whether the evidence regarding Foster’s alleged use of force could be legally justified as self-defense and had no option of acquitting Foster of the charges in light of his admissions. *See Dugar v. State*, 464 S.W.3d 811, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (explaining that when self-defense “instruction was taken away from the jury, appellant was left without his only defensive theory, making his conviction a virtual inevitability”). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a determination that Foster was harmed by the error.

Regarding the parties’ arguments, Foster discussed self-defense during his opening and closing statements. In particular, he asserted during his opening statement that the evidence

would show that Morris was the aggressor, that Morris assaulted Foster with a knife first, and that Foster fought back to “protect his life,” and Foster also related that the jury should consider his “evidence of self-defense” when making their determination. In his closing arguments, Foster attacked the victim’s credibility and urged that the State had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but Foster also noted that there was no self-defense instruction in the jury charge and that he could not argue self-defense in this case. Moreover, the State in its closing referenced the portions of Foster’s testimony in which he admitted that his actions resulted in Morris being cut. Accordingly, this factor would seem to weigh in favor of a determination that Foster was harmed by the absence of a self-defense instruction in the jury charge.

Turning to other portions of the record, we note that during voir dire, the State and Foster both emphasized self-defense. In particular, the State listed the elements of the defense and provided examples of when self-defense might and might not be warranted. Additionally, Foster focused on self-defense and extensively questioned the panelists about whether they could entertain a self-defense instruction when the defendant is a man and when the alleged victim is a woman. Further, the district court explained during voir dire what the elements of self-defense are and stated that if the elements were met, then there would be an instruction for that defense in the jury charge. Later, the district court went through the elements again after displaying the statutory provision for the jury panelists to examine, questioned the panel about whether they thought that “a man can’t ever have a self-defense claim against a woman,” and discussed what types of force would be considered a reasonable response to an attack. Given the focus on self-defense and in light of the district court’s statement that an instruction would only be provided if the evidence warranted an instruction, we

believe that this factor weighs in favor of a determination that Foster was harmed by the omission. *Cf. Johnson v. State*, 271 S.W.3d 359, 368 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. ref'd) (noting as part of harm analysis that defendant questioned jury panel on defensive theory).

Regarding the evidence presented at trial, we note, as summarized above, that Foster admitted in his testimony to using force against Morris that resulted in Morris being injured and asserted that he was defending himself against Morris's alleged assault, and photographs of injuries that Foster purportedly sustained on the night in question were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. In addition, Detective Anderson testified that Foster may have had defensive wounds to his hands and that Morris expressed concern that she might be charged for her conduct on the night in question. Moreover, on the recordings of Foster's phone conversations, Foster stated that Morris held the knife to his throat.

Unquestionably, other evidence was presented during trial indicating that Morris did not assault Foster on the night in question and significantly undermining Foster's claim of self-defense. However, in light of the evidence raising the issue of self-defense, of our resolution of the factors discussed above, and of the governing case law indicating that the denial of a defensive instruction in cases involving a single offense is generally harmful, *see Cornet*, 417 S.W.3d at 451, we cannot conclude that the absence of a self-defense instruction was harmless under the circumstances present here.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by denying Foster's request for a self-defense instruction and that the failure to provide that instruction resulted in some harm to Foster. *Cf. Johnson*, 271 S.W.3d at 368-69 (determining that defendant was harmed by

absence of defensive instruction where defendant admitted that she stabbed victim “to stop him from jumping on her or hitting her” but where “jury was not instructed to consider” defensive theory, which prevented jury from considering acquitting defendant “by reason of her immediate need to defend herself”); *VanBrackle*, 179 S.W.3d at 717 (concluding that trial “court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense caused some harm to appellant” despite significant deficiencies in defensive evidence). Accordingly, we sustain Foster’s first issue on appeal.

Having sustained Foster’s first issue on appeal, we need not address Foster’s second issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Having sustained Foster’s first issue on appeal, we reverse the district court’s judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland

Reversed and Remanded

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